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FIFTY-FIvE IIEN. By Fred Rodell.1 New York: Stackpole Sons, 1936.
Pp. 277. $2.50.
Reviewed by Harold J. Laski.t
Tais book performs a very difficult task in wholly admirable fashion. From
the complicated records of the Philadelphia Convention, above all on the basis
of Madison's famous notes, Professor Rodell has set out the way in which
the Constitution assumed its shape; and, for good measure, he has added a
brief account of the amendments *and their purpose. What emerges in the
result is a sharply etched portrait of one of the supreme constitutional efforts
of modern times. The simple way in which the narrative unfolds itself almost
conceals the scholarly art with which it is constructed. Let it therefore be
said with emphasis that no brief book on its subject tells better than this one
what the men of Philadelphia really set out to do and what did in fact
emerge from their labours. It will not, I suspect, command whole-hearted
assent, above all from the pundits of patriotism. Professor Rodell's Fathers
are human beings of flesh and blood, not less concerned than modern states-
men round a conference table to reach results in which many of them had
a direct and solid interest. They are not the bloodless dancers of a wraith-
like ballet of categories concerned only with the maintenance of pure forms.
They did not conceive themselves as the architects of an eternal structure.
They were dealing as practical minded men of affairs with a body of imme-
diate and concrete problems which they attacked from a special anglb of
vision. Havifig made the compromises inherent in their task, they left the
adjustment of later pressures to the men who would be concerned with their
impact.
What emerges from Professor Rodell's portrait? Above all, I think, two
things. In the first place, the founders were building a national government.
Granted all the defences they accepted "for the rights of the separate states,
they had no doubt at all that they were constructing a national system con-
cerned to protect national interests, and to develop them, and, so far forth,
with the power to transcend state interests and to control these on behalf
of the nation as a whole. Had they failed to do this the Philadelphia con-
vention would have been a fruitless achievement. No doubt, in the ebb and
flow of discussion, the incidence of emphasis about the meaning of the powers
conferred shifts now in one direction and now in another. But it is evident
that if the convention did not mean the definite victory of nationalism over
parochialism it had no meaning. After all, it was for that end, and for no
other end, that it had become urgent to revise the relationship between the
different states.
In the second place, they were deeply concerned to place the interests of
property beyond the reach of attack from popular vote. They did not be-
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lieve in a democracy whose will should have unlimited authority over the
disposition of affairs. The Fathers, as Professor Rodell rightly insists, had
a healthy respect for the man with a stake in the country. They did not
want him to be voted down by the envy, the jealousy, even the hate, they
felt in their bones that the poor in any society must have for the rich. They
therefore put into the Constitution every device they dared to insert to effect
the protection of property. They felt, with Madison, that the struggle over
the limits of the rights of' property is the one durable source of faction in
society. They did not want the mere force of numbers ever to be able, of
itself, to control the sovereign power of the state.
In the century and a half that has passed since Philadelphia a new world
has come into being. It is of the essence of Professor Rodell's analysis to
insist that no one can know what the Fathers would have thought of that
world. No one, accordingly, can rightfully interpret the "meaning" of the
Constitution in terms of the purpose of its founders. Those who do so,
whether they are members of the Supreme Court, or members of a political
party, are merely attributing to them ideas they themselves wish to see
operative. The test of constitutionality cannot be set on the basis of the
problems confronted in 1787, simply because neither those problems, nor
any comparable to them, exist. The test must clearly be the wisdom of
the legislation proposed in its relation to what a century and a half of tra-
dition has made of the Constitution. If that does not' permit effective govern-
ance in the United States, then the case for profound constitutional change
becomes of decisive importance.
Professor Rodell, rightly, makes the pivot of the whole position the place
of the Supreme Court in the operation of the Constitution. It is, as he points
out, the one check on popular action that now remains. For what purpose
is it to operate the authority it possesses? Is it to prohibit as unconstitu-
tional legislation it happens to think unwise? Is it to find ways and means
of adapting the canons of constitutionality to the new needs of a new time?
If it is entitled to do the first, what is its title to set its view of legislation
against that of the President and Congress? If it is entitled to do the second,
what canons of constitutionality is it to adopt? Certainly, if it does the first,
it becomes simply a legislative chamber the views of which are a function
of its accidental composition; and such a chamber cannot long run counter
to popular opinion and retain the respect which maintains authority. If it
performs the second task, the technique of adaptation must proceed along
a groove of principles common to the court as a whole. For without that
position the court cannot maintain confidence in its impartiality; it will,
sooner or later, leave the impression that its members choose their postulates
in order to reach ends upon which they have already decided. And if the
ends upon which a majority of the court decides are incompatible with those
sought by the President and Congress, in the long run the court will have
to give way.
This is, of course, to raise issues which go far beyond the ambit of Pro-
fessor Rodell's survey. His book will have amply served his purpose if it
convinces the student of two things. (1) The Fathers had a philosophy of
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government which, right or wrong, was suited to, as it was born of, the
circumstances of their time. No one is entitled to make that philosophy a
limitation upon the habits of the American people today. They are as free
to remake the purposes of their institutions as they were to decide, in 1776,
to free themselves from British rule. (2) The use of that philosophy in
the present crisis as a weapon is a futile Jiistorical exercise. It is as valid
as the use of Aristotle to prove that the case for slavery has been made out.
The conditions which went to the making of that'philosophy are so different
from those which led to its acceptance as to make the repetition of that
case an essay in ignorant antiquarianism which no one can accept who knows
at all realistically the motivation of political philosophies. I hope that Pro-
fessor Rodell's book will be widely read. If it does no more than drive home
these two fundamental lessons, .it will not have been written in vain.
Reviewed by Henry Steele Commager4
Fifty-Five Men is an attempt to retell the story of the making of the
Constitution in terms at once realistic and simple. With the exception of
one brief chapter on the ratification of the Constitution and one chapter of
provocative surmise on "What Would the Founding Fathers Think Today",
Mr. Rodell has confined himself entirely to what went on in the Federal
Convention of 1787. R-e has drawn his material from Madison's notes, and
his brief text is generously sprinkled with appropriate quotations from that
inexhaustible source. The book is designed, as far as can be discovered,
to prove that the Founding Fathers were concerned primarily with the pro-
tection of property interests against an up-start democracy, and that they
constructed a government with this in view. Though this thesis monopolizes
a large part of the volume, some attention is given to the special problems
of representation and of the nature of the executive.
It is not without interest to note the character of the book as indicated
by the publisher's, jacket-with, we may assume, the approval of the author.
"Were the Founding Fathers Gods or Men" we are asked, and we may
wonder whether the book is designed to answer this preposterous question,
to annihilate this flimsy straw-man. "Were these Fathers omniscient, benev-
olent men, concerned solely with guaranteeing our liberties" we are asked
further, and quicldy assured that, "upon these questions this book gives
us not fables but hard-bitten facts. Here, after 150 years, is the popular,
dramatic story of just how much democracy the Founding Fathers intended
us to have."
Everything about this introductory blurb. is an affront. It will not be
supposed that Mr. Rodell intends to devote a book to proving that the
Fathers of the Constitution were not omniscient, and it may be wondered
whether there is any purpose in discovering whether they were or were
not benevolent. And as to the query whether the Fathers were "concerned
solely with guaranteeing our liberties" that is a leading question and proper-
ly objectionable--irrelevant, immaterial, and tending to confuse and to prej-
:Professor of History, New York University.
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udice the issue. Nor, it may be added, have we had to wait 150 years for
a consideration of the attitude of the Fathers toward democracy or for an
analysis of what the publishers call, preposterously, the "much-neglected
notes" of James Madison.
Publisher's advertisements are notoriously misleading, and it might be
proper to dismiss this as merely an extreme example of bad taste, were it
not for the fact that here the promise of the advertisement is, distressingly
enough, fulfilled in the text. For, Mr. Rodell has actually written a book
about the making of the Constitution in which the chief emphasis is upon
the relation of the Constitution to Democracy. He has actually written a
book which confines itself almost entirely to the annihilation of straw men
and which fails completely to substitute real men.
Everything about this book is unfortunate. It is written in a vacuum, with-
out background or foreground, without any understanding of the real func-
tion of the Constitutional Convention or the real achievement of the men
who drafted the Constitution. It is based upon source material, but that
basis is shockingly narrow and the material itself is handled uncritically.
It presents conclusions which are, for the most part, either irrelevant or
misleading.
Mr. Rodell has made the discovery that government is organized to pro-
tect property as well as to protect life and liberty-a discovery that was a
familiar axiom to political thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies in England and America. He applies this idea to the work of the
Federal Convention, and fails to realize that as a standard of measurement
it is irrelevant. Everyone, after all, agreed that one of the functions of
government was to protect property; the problem that vexed statesmen on
both sides of the Atlantic in the Revolutionary era was that of deciding
which government, local or national, was the proper one to exercise this
authority in specific cases. Everyone agreed that some government had to
regulate commerce, control money, lay taxes, administer lands, and so forth.
But should these powers be exercised by the Parliament at W¥estminister
or by the legislatures in the American colonies? Should these powers be
exercised by a central government in the United States or by the States?
The question was one of division of power, and the task which faced the
Fathers of the Constitution was the supremely difficult one of drawing with
wisdom and common sense the best line of division.
Mr. RodelI, indeed, has succeeded in missing the most obvious fact about
the Federal Constitution, namely that it is a Federal Constitution. He has
managed to miss the fact that the Convention which drafted the Constitution
was a Federal Convention. He has managed to write a book about the
Convention and the Constitution without once considering, in any intelligent
fashion, the question of Federalism, without once realizing what it was the
Fathers of the Convention were trying to do. It was because British states-
men had been unable to distinguish properly between central and local author-
ity that the Revolution came; it was because the division of power between
central and state authorities under the Articles of Confederation was faulty
that the Confederation broke down. The task that faced the members of
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the Philadelphia Convention was that of devising a workable federal system,
of allocating to the national government those powers properly of a general
nature and leaving to the state governments those powers properly of a
local nature. This problem was solved-not perfectly, as the Civil War
is witness-but intelligently. It was solved in part because the members
of the Convention had behind them the experience of the colonies in the
British Empire and of the States under the Confederation, in part because
they were remarkably wise and remarkably realistic, in part because it was
to the interest of the groups that they represented to have it solved.
But this supremely great achievement-the solution of the problem of
federalism-is nowhere mentioned in Mr. Rodell's book. What Mr. Rodell
is concerned with is the attitude of the Fathers towards democracy, not toward
federalism, and the major part of his book is given over to a consideration
of this immaterial question. It should not be necessary to emphasize that
that question is both immaterial and irrelevant. The business of the delegates
to the Convention was not to construct a government that was either demo-
cratic or undemocratic. It was to construct a system of relationships between
governments. Except in a few instances-not unimportant ones to be sure
-the question of democracy didn't enter into the problem any more than
the question of democracy enters into the problem of the. organization of a
League of Nations today. Almost everything that affected what we think
of as democracy-suffrage, representation, social legislation, education, and
so forth, was under the control of the States and was left there.
This is not to argue that the Fathers of the Constitution were democratic.
A correct answer to that question demands first a definition of democracy
and a realization of the changing meaning of the term. On the whole it
may be admitted that, even by the standards of the eighteenth century, the
Fathers of the Constitution were not democratic. It may be admitted that
they did not desire a democratic form of government or of society. But
the proof of that must be found not in an examination of the Federal Con-
stitution, but in an examination of State Constitutions and State Laws.
This initial and grotesque misconception of the purpose of the Conven-
tion and the meaning of the Constitution permeates and vitiates the whole
of Mr. Rodell's book. But even though most of Mr. Rodell's energy is
dissipated in following this false scent, he does necessarily give some atten-
tion to the work of the Convention. His account of the debates is, as he
assures us, based upon Madison's Notes, and embodies 'hard-bitten facts'.
But facts, as Carl Becker never tires of reminding us, are curious things.
One trouble with them is that there are so many of them; another trouble
.is that facts by themselves are meaningless-they must be selected and they
must be interpreted. Mr. Rodell's facts are right enough, but his selection
and his inferpretation are open to serious objections.
In the beginning, for example, Mr. Rodell assures- us that the members
of the Convention "had been sent by their states only to make a few changes
in the flimsy Articles of Confederation", aid he returns to this charge again
and again. There is much foundation for the assertion. The resolution of
Congress did call a convention for "the sole and express purpose of revising
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the Articles of Confederation'. Does this mean that the States authorized their
delegates to make only "a few changes" or, as Mr. Rodell elsewhere says,
"a few minor changes"? An examination of the instructions to the delegates
leads to a different conclusion. The delegates from South Carolina, for
example, were authorized to join with others in "devising . . . all such
Alterations, Clauses, Articles and Provisions as may be thought necessary
to render the Federal Constitution entirely adequate to the actual Situation
and future good government of the confederated States.' The delegates
from New Iampshire were instructed "to discuss and decide upon the most
effectual means to remedy the defects in our federal Union; and to procure
ad secure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to effect ' 2
The difficulty with so many of Mr. Rodells generalizations is that they
tell only a half-truth or that they leave a mistaken impression upon the
mind of the unwary reader. It is Mr. Rodell's thesis, for example, that the
States under the Articles of Confederation, retained their independence, but
that this independence was surrendered by the delegates at Philadelphia.
To substantiate this, he points out, "the committee also took a few more
shots at what little was left of state independence. Each state was ordered
to give 'full faith and credit' to the laws and court decisions of every other
State." Precisely. But Mr. Rodell fails to point out the two really inter-
esting things about this famous Full Faith and Credit clause: first, that it
was copied directly from the Articles of Confederation-those Articles which
Mr. Rodell wishes to contrast with the Constitution, and second, that it
presupposed a system of relationships between states on the basis of inter-
national law and comity.
Or again, we are assured that the decision of the Convention to refer the
finished Constitution to state ratifying conventions rather than to the State
legislatures was inspired by a fear of the State legislatures and by a belief
that the people would more readily accept the new document. These con-
siderations may have been effective, but it is a little disconcerting that Mr.
Rodell does not mention the real and logical reason. That reason is the
obvious one that reference to state legislatures would have been highly im-
proper because only conventions, holding authority directly from the people,
could properly accept a fundamental law.
Or again, in the brief and superficial discussion of ratification, Mr. Rodell
tells us that "lined up on one side were the business men and the manu-
facturers, the men with . . .money to invest . . . Fighting against these
men, and against the Constitution, were the poor, the small farmers, the
men who worked with their hands." There is, of course, some truth in this
-though it would be interesting to know who were the 'manufacturers' in
the United States of 1788. But the generalization is so broad, so simple,
as to be downright misleading. Any student who has read Libby's study of
the geographical distribution of the vote on the Constitution,- any student
1. TAVsmir, DocumENrs ILLUsTRaAWvE OF THE Fo=ATION oF THE UNIoN oF THE
A-NmuecA STATEs (1927) 56.
2. Id. at 78.
3. LiBB-, THE GEocRAwcAL DisramurTou or THE Vor o:r a T nE Frm . Coir-
sTIutoN (1894).
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who remembers the support of the Constitution from the farmers of western
Massachusetts and western Virginia, knows that this generalization needs
a great deal of qualification.
To emphasize the human and fallible qualities of the Fathers of the Con-
stitution, to emphasize the economic considerations behind the debates and
compromises of the Constitution, Is a laudable purpose. But that purpose
is not served by such an approach and such an interpretation as Mr. Rodell
has given us. The Constitutional Convention cannot be undirstood in a
vacuum; it must beunderstood and interpreted against the background of
British federalism, the Revolution, and the Confederation. It is not to be
understood or interpreted as an effort either to achieve or to control or to
obstruct democracy; it must be understood as an effort to erect a federal
system. Mr. Rodell's book will do more to obfuscate the real character of
the Constitution than will a dozen sentimental books by filiopietistic authors
who regard the Fathers as "Gods rather than Men".
THE PRxNCIPLES OF CONTRACT, Tenth Edition. By Sir Frederick Pollock.'
London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1936. Pp. lxiii, 762. $8.00.
As the author says in his preface to this new edition, no great novelty is
to be expected in it. There are, however, some additions and changes. Under
the heading of acceptance of conditions annexed, by reference, there is a
somewhat elaborate treatment of the duties which are assumed to exist with
reference to those who deal with public service companies. American writers
would doubtless mainly classify these duties as relational and imposed by
law irrespective of assent, rather than endeavor to treat them under the
heading of contracts.
There is also some treatment of an Act passed in 1935, which abolishes
married women's common law disability to hold and deal with property,
and, thereby, as regards future settlements, also abolishes in effect the doc-
trine of separate estate with its safeguard of restraint on anticipation.2 The
Restatement of Contracts is referred to in the preface, but it is said to be
remote from the needs of English lawyers. There are, however, some refer-
ences to it in the body of the book.
Changes are found in various places throughout the book, but none of
them of considerable moment. It has always been a cause for regret that
the author does not consider more fully the duties and conditions arising
in the course of the performance of a contract. Especially, the comparatively
modem doctrines relating to repudiation and anticipatory breach are treated
but slightly. The author makes no clear statement of all th6 consequences of
electing the alternatives allowed in case of anticipatory breach, but perhaps
the implication from certain statements3 is that if the injured party does not
1. Of Lincoln's Inn.
2. THE LAw REroiu= (MAnIED WOMEN AND ToRTFzAsoRs) Acr, 1935, 25 & 26




elect to treat the repudiatiott as a breach, he remains subject to the necessity,
on his part, of performance or of readiness and willingness to perform, in
order either to acquire a right of action or a freedom from liability, these
being the consequences stated by Cockburn, C. J., in Frost v. Knight.'
On the next page,5 however, it is stated that when a promisor's performance
is prevented, it is to that extent excused and that there is also a cause of
action. No observation is made of the possible contradiction that this in-
volves with the consequences stated in Frost v. Knight, if by prevention
the author means to include cases where there is no physical interference
but merely an inducement to refrain from performance by a manifestation
either that there will be such interference in the future or that no return
performance will be given. That the English law allowed an excuse in such
cases prior to the development of the doctrine of anticipatory breach, when
the injured party was a plaintiff as well as when he was a defendant, was
clear enough from the cases of Ripley v. M'Clurc and Cort v. Ambergato
Ry.7 Neither of these cases is here cited. Whether this principle remained
applicable in case of an anticipatory repudiation which the pronisee
did not elect to treat as a breach, seemed more than doubtful after the
decision of Frost v. Knight, until 1923. In that year, the House of Lords
in British & Beningtons, Ltd. v. North Western Cachar Tea Co.$ apparently
overruled, though this is not in terms stated, decisions holding that the
injured party still remains bound to perform, unless he elects to treat the
repudiation as a breach. This important decision is cited by the author,
but only for a wholly different point.
Aiiother important recent decision, entirely omitted, is British Russianz
Gazetti, Ltd. v. Associated NMe-spapers, Ltd.,0 which finalfy disposes of
the many statements in the earlier books that an accord unexecuted is
invalid. The previous decisions and statements are said no longer -to be
of any authority beyond establishing that an accord is not a defense to the
earlier claim, unless itself accepted as satisfaction.
The index of the work, like the indices of many English law books, strikes
an American lawyer as too meagre. For instance, it does not contain the
words "anticipatory breach", "repudiation" or "accord and satisfaction',
though all these terms are used in the text.
SAMEL WILLIsnoZZ
Cambridge, Mass.
4. L. R. 7 E.- 111 (1872).
5. P.270.
6. 4 Ex. 345 (1849).
7. 17 Q. B. 127 (1851).
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SEcuRITY ACAINST SICkNEss. By I. S. Falk.' New York: Doubleday Doran,
1936. Pp. 433. $4.00.
IN this book Dr. Falk-doctor of public health, and consequently a "lay-
man" or a "sociological meddler" from the point of view of organized medicine
-has written the most thorough and convincing brief for health insurance
that has yet appeared. He writes out of the almost unrivalled background of
his work as staff director of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care,
and later as a member of the technical staff of the Milbank Memorial Fund.
He covers with sufficient fullness every dimension of his subject-except the
dimension of social and political conflict which health insurance is now enter-
ing, four years after Dr. Fishbein, editor of the Journal of the American
Medical Association, denounced the mild majority report of the Committee
on the Costs of Medical Care (signed by its chairman, Dr. Ray Lyman Wil-
bur, past president of the A.M.A. and Secretary of the Interior under Hoover,
and a majority of the medical members of the Committee) as the work of
"socialists, communists, inciting to revolution."
Dr. Falk is neither naive nor timorous. He knows that very little happens
in our society merely because it is just and sensible. Progress occurs only
when there is developed a sufficiently intelligent and powerful mobilization
of economic and political pressure to achieve the desired result. But Falk
is not a politician, nor a crusader. Purely as a technician, he has described
what would be just, functional, and sensible with respect to the organization
of the health services. Now let Dr. Fishbein cry havoc and let loose the medi-
cal dogs of war. Now it's the turn of the crusaders like John A. Kingsbury,
whose vigorous advocacy of health insurance brought about his dismissal from
the secretaryship of the Milbank Fund; they will find Falk's book invaluable.
They can wield Falk against Fishbein, which is much like using an axe on
a mosquito.
It is really a triangular fight, involving the lay-patient, the doctor, and the
state. Sir Arthur Newsholme makes this clear in a classic statement :2
"Civilized communities have arrived at two decisions, from which
there will be no retreat, though their full realization in experience
has nowhere been achieved.
"In the first place, the health of every individual is a social con-
cern and responsibility; and secondly, as following from this, medical
care in its widest sense for every individual is an essential condition
of maximum efficiency and happiness in a civilized community."
And the irony of the situation in America today is that all the parties at
interest would be immensely advantaged by a functional reorganization of
our health services; further, that without adding appreciably to our present
medical budget-about four. percent of the national income-we could pro-
vide adequate medical care for the millions of the population who don't get
it now, make a huge cut in the tax burden spent for sick dependency, and save
1. Research Associate, Milbank Memorial Fund.
2. See MEDICINE AND THE STATE (1932) c. 1.
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at least six billions a year in terms of life capital and preventable working-
time losses to industry, all that, and still pay the doctors more than they
are getting today-more even than they got in 1928, when thirty-three per-
cent of them netted less than $2,500 a year.
While advocating the economies and efficiencies of group practice, as logi-
cally entailed by the essentially "collectivist" nature of the modern science
and art of medicine, Falk urges that the horse of group insurance payment,
organized on a national compulsory scale, should precede the cart of group
practice. An evolutionary, voluntary group payment and group practice de-
velopment along the lines recommended by the majority report of the Com-
mittee on the Costs of Medical Care might lead, he thinks, only into a morass
of debased commercial contract practice. Says Falk: "Instead of organizing
for the payment of medical costs after having achieved improvement of.prac-
tice, society must organize for payment in order to achieve improvement in
service."
3
So much for Falk's theoretical solution of our medical difficulties. The
problems of legal rights and political tactics are something else again. The
health services, today, are caught in an Alice-in-Wronderland maze of mutually
contradictory "rights." Members of the legal profession who read this review
are invited to try tugging at any one or all of the loose strings that emerge
from this maze and see how the tangled skein knots and tightens.
1. The phycsican: He has the right to sell his training and skill for as
much as he can get in the market and to insist that the philanthropic and
publicly financed health agencies limit themselves strictly to matters of sani-
tation, public hygiene, and the service of the indigent. He has the right to
crusade against the lesser tribes of healers without the law-the quacks, the
cultists, the nostrum-makers; he also has the right to denounce fairly or
unfairly the "sociological meddlers" like Falk who have ventured to suggest
new ways and means of organizing and paying for medical care.
These rights are coupled with duties, the chief of which is the traditional
duty of the physician to deliver medical service whether or not he is paid
for it; this duty is balanced by the right to tax his rich patients for the un-
paid or partly paid service he gives to the poor. He has also his duty to
his colleagues, which is defined in the medical code of ethics and enforced
by his professional organization-a kind of state within the state. The phy-
sician may not advertise either truthfully or otherwise in his own behalf, and
he may denounce nostrum-makers for advertising at the sam& time that the
activities of the organized profession are largely financed by the advertising
expenditures of the same, or closely affiliated nostrum-makers in the Journal
of the American Medical Association. Organized medicine also has the "right,"
affirmed in clause 7 of the official code of ethics, to combat forms of group
medical practice which in its judgment are "contrary to sound public policy"
and to expel from membership in the American Medical Association any
physician who engages in such forms of practice. But since the law does not
make membership in the A. MI. A. a condition of the legal right to practice,
the offending physicians engaging in group practice have the right to make
3. P. 333.
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their own judgment of their own and the public interest, advertise for patients,
and serve them.
2. The patient: With respect to the use, disuse, and abuse of the health
services our rugged American layman has almost unlimited liberties and
rights. There are no class distinctions. In the words of Anatole France,
every man "labors in the face of the majestic equality of the laws which for-
bid rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal their bread." It is true, of course, that in practically all private and
semi-private, hospitals the ward, semi-private, and private patients are rigidly
segregated and the appropriate differentials in the quality of .quarters, food,
and of the quantity, at least, of medical and nursing attentions are fully main-
tained. But then, if the patient objects to these discriminations he has the
right not to go to the hospital at all-not, at least, until a neighbor feels she
has the right and duty to call the ambulance. The ward physician then has
the right to scold the patient roundly for failing to obtain diagnosis and treat-
ment sooner-he has a ruptured appendix and at best can make only a partial
recovery. Such scolding is of course, unjust; the patient had a perfect right
to consult the chiropractor who almost broke his back, to dose himself with
useless or harmful patent medicines, to be ashamed to call his regular physi-
cian whose past bills were unpaid. (The physician in any case would have
had the right to say he was too busy to attend him). Our patient, however,
is secure in his ultimate rights. If he dies the state will bury him and take
cate of his dependents after a fashion. And if he leaves the hospital to become
one of the unemployable chronic sick, the state will also take care of him
and them-after a:fashion calculated to stabilize that unemployability and to
impair appreciably the vitality of future generations. Surely nothing must
be done to dim the splendor of these rights, to impugn these hard-won liber-
ties. As things stand, the patient has the right to do, or fail to do, almost
anything except shbot himself-that's against the law. But he can easily get
an equivalent result in any one of a hundred ways, either for himself or for
his dependents. For example, he can decline, in behalf of himself and his
children, immunization against contagious disease and the American League
for Medical Freedom will support him in this right to the end that such fully
demonstrated preventive measures may not be extended to more than five
percent of our population, as at present. He can also neglect a gonorrheal
or syphilitic infection and communicate it to others.
3. The sociologists, economists, and public health workers: Representing
this group, Dr. Falk has the right to prove up to the hilt, as he does, that,
all "rights" aside, the existing organization of medical care is chaotic, waste-
ful, and lags far behind the progress made in almost every other civilized
country. He has the right to point out that we spend, for urban and rural
public health work from one-third to one-seventh as much as it would pay
us to spend. He has the right to show that unmet medical need exists in huge
volume and that our neglect of this need costs us, as Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur
has also testified, "more than we can afford." He has the right to demon-
strate the plain common sense of applying the insurance principle to the pay-
ment of medical costs, since no family with an income of less than $5,000
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a year can otherwise protect itself against the unequal incidence and cost of
disabling illness. He has the right to point out, as he does, that organized
medicine, specifically, the journal of the American Medical Association, has
misrepresented the English and European experience with health insurance.
In short, Dr. Falk had the right to do his job honestly and well, and has
fully exercised that right It's a free country. Long may she wave.
JAuL-s RoRaT
Westport, Conn.
CRImE AND JusTIcE. By Sheldon Glueck.1 Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1936. Pp. viii, 349. $3.00.
Ix the spring of 1935 Professor Glueck of the Harvard Law School de-
livered eight lectures before a lay audience in the Lowell Institute, Boston.
They are here published as a book for the benefit of an audience which we hope
will be as large as possible, for the volume is rich in substance and provoca-
tive in form. Unfortunately, the title is somewhat colorless. "The Diseases
of Criminal Justice" would have been more descriptive, for the author has
"stressed the ills of criminal justice in the belief that by studying the diseased
-organs we may be able to obtain some light on the destructive forces at work
and perhaps some hints as to the therapeutic and prophylactic measures that
are indicated. ' 2 The result of this approach is that the first six chapters
present a Rembrandtesque picture of American criminal justice, mostly
shadows with a few bright highlights, while the last two chapters offer sug-
gestions for reform.
The comprehensive and therefore necessarily sketchy character of the book
may be gleaned from a rapid summary of its contents. In a chapter on "The
Climate of Justice" Professor Glueck treats the relativity of the concept of
crime and the complexity of the task of justice, owing t6 the growing chasm
between the mores in law and administration and the findings of scientific
research, the social problem created by a machine age, and the growing dis-
respect for traditional symbols and agencies of authority-all more or less
interrelated. Then follows a chapter containing thumbnail sketches of the
police department, the city prosecutor's office, the courts and penal institu-
tions. In "The Lameness of Justice" we find an appraisal of the obstacles
existing in a complicated criminal procedure, weak juries, skepticism toward
extra-legal scientific knowledge and tools, the character of trials, the concept
of responsibility, and conflicting ideas of punishment which make the law a
bizarre body, full of vestigial organs whose functions have disappeared but
which cannot be bred out or cut out, because of reverence coupled with indiffer-
ence. A good analysis of the difficulties involved in appraising the amount of
crime found in this country opens the chapter on "The Blindness of Justice."
tAfx. Rorty has recently made a study of the cost of medical care for The Nation.
1. Professor of Criminology, Harvard University.
2. Introduction.
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The scarcity of reliable data and the inadequacy of record systems are men-
tioned and the effect of this deficiency on administrative practices are
described, especially as they refer to the exercise of judicial discretion, which
has been growing in response to the humanitarian as well as the scientific
attacks upon the traditional criminal law. The chapter on "The Knights of
Justice" returns again to the agencies of justice but stresses personnel instead
of external forms, The policeman, the magistrate, clerk, bailiffs, bail bonds-
men, jurors, probation and parole officers, and prison guards are characterized,
the author making effective use of the data gathered through local and state
surveys of criminal justice. In "The Pawns of Justice" the criminal is dis-
cussed and our knowledge of his characteristics and the causes of his offenses
is assayed, the author concluding that despite numerous etiological researches,
we as yet know very little about crime causation. In this chapter the results
of Professor and Mrs. Gluecl's own researches are given in brief and serve
as the basis for the conclusion that many offenders at least begin their careers
in youth and come from homes and neighborhoods which exert deleterious
influences on minds and bodies in the making.
The last two chapters, on "The Prospects of Justice" and "The Horizon
of Justice," contain Professor Gluecl's program of reform. Assuming that
therapeutic measures can cure or at least mitigate the diseases of justice, he
pleads for a scientific attitude toward law and its administration, argues for
the preparation of a "realistic" criminal code based on the principle of social
protection; the separation of the guilt-finding and the sentencing functions with
the latter entrusted to a board of experts; the periodic review of sentences,
and for safeguards against arbitrary sentences. The administrative machinery
to achieve these varied ends, he suggests, should be centralized in a Depart-
ment of Justice in each state, with bureaus integrating, controlling, or super-
vising the police, the courts, and the penal agencies.
Through the entire book the recurrent idea is better personnel: "All roads
of reform lead ultimately to the Rome of a greatly improved personnel."13 But
such personnel depends on revolutionary changes in public attitudes toward
government and ifs services, and it may well be that by the time attitudes
are formed which are favorable to the idea of professional instead of political
public servants, some of the other broad preventive measures suggested -by
the author will be on the point of realization, especially those growing out of
the economic adjustments which he rightly stresses as fundamental.
For those "professionally interested" Professor Glueck has added copious
footnotes in an appendix. Even without them, the excellent review which the
book presents of data familiar to most professional students of criminal jus-
tice would be of interest to them as it should be stimulating and provocative




tProfessor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania.
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DAs ENGLiSCHE KONKUSRECT. By Fel. Eckstein. Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1935. Pp. xv, 351.
Tu-. author of this monograph does not lay any claim to originality or
profundity of research, but he has none the less shown great skill in
achieving his object, which was to present to German readers an account
of the main features of the English law of bankruptcy in a form which would
enable them to understand its somewhat complicated provisions. The gen-
eral structure of the law of irfsolvency varies in some degree even in the
case of legal systems which have a common origin, but the differences
of rule which edst as between the German and the English law of bank-
ruptcy are in many respects of a fundamental character. The main reason
for this lies in the fact that certain features of the English Bankruptcy Act
of 19141 are absent from the German "Konkursordnung," notably the pro-
visions for the discharge of a bankrupt, and further that bankruptcy is, in
English law, confined to individuals and does not extend, as in the case of
the "Konkurs," to corporations. These distinctions, when coupled to others
of a less fundamental character, are prone to make it a difficult task for a
lawyer trained in one of the two systems to attune his mind so as to appre-
ciate the .inner workings of the other. Herein lies the chief merit of Dr.
Eckstein's very careful survey of the English law: he writes for German
lawyers and when the occasion calls for it the English law stands out in
relief against the background of the German rules which relate to a similar
situation.
The value of descriptive work of this kind has been challenged by some
comparative lawyers. It is, perhaps, true that this form of comparative
research is not considered to rank very high and that it sometimes fails
to lead to any result which can be regarded as of importance in relation to
the advancement of legal science. But the comparative method of research
calls for much prelininary work before it can be brought fully into oper-
ation and those who undertake the laborious and thankless task of providing
the necessary material for comparison can at the very least claim a place
among those who were described by Huxley as the "indispensable hodmen
of science." It must not be thought, in particular, that Dr. Eckstein's efforts
are purely of a pedestrian character. They go beyond mere patient investi-
gation, as witness his admirable analysis of the intricate situation which
occurs when the rule in Ex parte Wari9g2 comes into play. His adverse
criticism of the rule is one with which the reviewer finds himself in complete
agreement.
The statement of the law in the text is marked by lucidity and, generally
speaking, by accuracy, though, as is perhaps inevitable in a summary of this
nature, compression has occasionally resulted in an under-estimate of the
difficulties arising in connection with certain of the propositions advanced
by the author. It should be added that there is hardly a topic, however
minute, which is not dealt with, and it is evident that Dr. Ecksteln has
spared no effort to make his treatise as compfete as is reasonably possible
1. 4&5GEo. V,c. 59.
2. 19 Ves. 345 (CI. 1815).
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when dealing with so vast and complicated a subject. The sections relating
to the bankruptcy of married women must now be regarded as obsolete in
view of the changes introduced by the Law Reform (Married Women and
Tortfeasors) Act, 1935.8
If a knowledge of the law of other countries is-as the reviewer believes
-an important element in the prevention of international discord, Dr. Eck-
stein has made a valuable contribution to the cause of a better understanding
among the nations. H. C. GuTTERIDaEt
Cambridge, Eng.
3. 25 & 26 GEO. V, c. 30.
tFellow of Trinity Hall and Professor of Comparative Law, Cambride University.
